Metropolitan State Hospital--an endeavor in interlocal planning by Burghdoff, Dana L. (Dana Louise)
Metropolitan State Hospital:
An Endeavor in Interlocal Planning
by
Dana L. Burghdoff
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Bachelor of Science
and
Master of City Planning
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
May 1994
Copyright 1994 Dana L. Burghdoff
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to
reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of A uthor ...... . .. .. .... ..- -r, ----- i ............................
Dep ent of Jr ban Studies and Planning
Certified by ..................................
Adjunct Professor Philip Herr
Thesis Advisor
Accepted by
- - - - - --- . - -7 .. . . . .. .. . . . . ..
Professor Ralph A. Gakenheimer





An Endeavor in Interlocal Planning
by
Dana L. Burghdoff
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 19, 1994 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Science and
the Degree of Master of City Planning
Abstract
The thesis documents the reuse planning process for the closed Metropolitan State
Hospital to learn how complex group planning efforts are managed and how they may
be improved. The thesis presents guidelines for public sector group decision making
and negotiation. The thesis then discusses the reasons for the closure of state mental
hospitals and the steps of the Massachusetts property disposition process.
While the outcome of the Metropolitan State Hospital reuse planning may be
appropriate, the process used to achieve that outcome should be modified for use in
other planning processes. The thesis concludes that an initial creative step is useful in
community planning processes for allowing the members of the interest groups to
formulate their views on the planning issues before actual alternatives are proposed.
The thesis also concludes that an unbiased person from outside of the planning process
is valuable for managing the process and providing a written record of the process
results.
Implementation of these recommendations will help to ensure that the planning process
is efficient and will help guard against conflicts caused by misunderstanding and
misrepresentation.
Thesis Advisor: Philip Herr
Title: Adjunct Professor of City Planning
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Chapter One
Public Sector Decision Making
In an effort to understand the ways in which communities make planning
decisions, this thesis focuses on the Metropolitan State Hospital reuse planning
process. The Hospital property is owned by the State of Massachusetts and straddles
three diverse communities. The interaction required between the State and the
communities to determine a reuse plan for the Hospital property provides a wonderful
context for learning how planning processes are designed, how ideas emerge, and how
conflicts are resolved. By documenting the extensive planning process that has
occurred to date, the thesis will determine the lessons that can be drawn for
administering similar interlocal planning processes. Specifically, I will argue that the
community groups must create a forum for determining and legitimizing their
individual interests before creating and deciding among different alternatives. I will
also argue that someone with no stake in the planning issues should be responsible for
managing the decision making process and for keeping a written record of the results.
Introduction
In 1991, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered into its last phase of
state hospital closure and consolidation, a process which had begun in the mid-1960s
due to fiscal incentives and to changing treatment techniques for the mentally ill and
mentally handicapped. Of the twelve original state hospitals for the mentally ill, seven
5
have been closed and declared surplus by the State Department of Mental Health.
According to Massachusetts law, the State Division of Capital Planning and Operations
(DCPO) takes control of surplus properties in order to dispose of them. Through
consultations with public officials and, sometimes, private groups, DCPO decides
whether to transfer the properties to a different state agency, to a local public agency,
or to a private entity or individual. For large properties, the disposition process can
be quite complicated since public officials and private citizens will often propose a
wide variety of uses for DCPO to consider. Further, once DCPO completes its reuse
recommendations, the State legislature must approve them. Obtaining the approval of
the State legislature can be difficult if a legislator and his or her constituents favor a
reuse that DCPO does not recommend. In fact, disposition legislation has only been
filed for a couple of the seven closed Department of Mental Health hospitals, and the
legislature has not approved any of the bills.
In order to understand how DCPO makes the complex decisions required in
large property disposition processes, I have chosen the Metropolitan State Hospital
disposition as a case study. The Metropolitan State Hospital (hereafter referred to as
Met State) was declared surplus in September, 1992. The Met State disposition is in
some ways more complicated for DCPO than the other hospital disposition processes
because the Met State property straddles three communities, rather than just one or
two. Since the interests of the three Met State communities differ, there are a large
number of reuse proposals for DCPO to consider. In order to receive input from the
three communities, DCPO asked the community officials to each appoint a Reuse Task
Force. DCPO and the three Task Forces have met frequently for the last two years to
discuss reuse options for Met State. The disposition process for Met State is not yet
complete, although DCPO and the Task Forces have established a detailed framework
for the possible reuse options. The thesis will document the preliminary Met State
planning process that has been completed to date. Based on what is learned from the
Met State case study, the thesis will then present recommendations for conducting
similar interlocal planning processes.
I learned of the Met State reuse planning process through my internship with
the City of Waltham Planning Department. The City of Waltham is one of the three
Met State communities. While I was not an actor in the Met State process, my
internship gave me the opportunity to attend Met State meetings, speak with people
directly involved in the process, and obtain written materials produced throughout the
process. In addition, my thesis advisor, Professor Philip Herr, is a planning
consultant and a non-voting Task Force member for the Town of Belmont, which is
another Met State community. Professor Herr's involvement in the Met State process
allowed me to obtain materials produced before I became an intern with the City of
Waltham.
The thesis begins with general guidelines for managing multi-party decision
making and negotiation. Chapter Two then explains the history behind the
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill that led to the closure and consolidation of the
Massachusetts state mental hospitals. Chapter Three describes the Massachusetts
property disposition process. Chapter Four documents the decision-making method
used by DCPO and the three communities to conduct the preliminary planning stage of
the Met State disposition process. Lastly, Chapter Five presents recommendations for
conducting similar decision-making processes involving more than one community.
Group Decision-Making Guidelines
This section will discuss several guidelines for group decision making. In the
case of Met State, group participation in the disposition decision making process is
recommended by State legislation. While the legislation suggests that DCPO create an
advisory committee, the legislation does not prescribe a specific process for working
with the committee to formulate property reuse restrictions. For the Met State
process, DCPO created the three community Reuse Task Forces to serve as its
advisory committee. The process initiated by DCPO resembles an unassisted
negotiation, which is only one of a number of decision making models. According to
some of the Task Force members, the process has been a long and painful one. The
thesis attempts to determine whether the decision making model selected by DCPO
and the Task Force members is an appropriate one for complex planning efforts.
Authors Doyle and Straus present several criteria for group decision making processes
that they have employed to reconcile opposing interests in the public, private, and non-
profit sectors:
1. There must be a common focus on content.
2. There must be a common focus on process.
3. Someone must be responsible for maintaining an open and balanced conversation
flow.
4. Someone must be responsible for protecting individuals from personal attack.
5. And, in general, for the duration of the meeting everyone's role and responsibility
must be clearly defined and agreed upon.1
The ability of the Met State process to meet these criteria will be discussed in Chapter
Five.
Group decision making processes can also be enhanced by recording the
discussion from the meetings. Assigning a neutral person to take minutes at every
meeting is beneficial in order to:
1. Have a formal statement of the group's accomplishments.
2. Have a record of all intermediate decisions that lead to and supply a basis for the
major decisions.
3. Protect against misunderstanding and misperception by individual members.
4. Act as a running account of group process." 2
In the Met State case, minutes were taken by a neutral person at a few of the first
meetings, but no one has been responsible for taking minutes since then.
If meeting members have differing perceptions, whether based upon different
memories, disagreement over facts, or different values, conflict will result. Group
conflict is not necessarily unfavorable, but poor handling of conflict is.
Many of the difficulties of group conflict management arise because the group
does not have procedure to turn to for coping with conflict. ... Following a
plan encourages rational analysis to take precedence over emotional outburst.
Fundamental to any plan is the possibility of negotiation. "3
Negotiation is one method of resolving conflict. Negotiation "is back-and-forth
communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have
'Michael Doyle and David Straus, How to Make Meetings Work (New York: Berkley Books, 1976), p.
32.
2Rudolph F. Verderber, Working Together (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982), p.
130.
'Ibid., p. 113.
some interests that are shared and others that are opposed." 4 Several types of
negotiation are discussed below.
Unassisted Negotiation
An unassisted negotiation is one in which the parties have come together on
their own to make a decision and to resolve any differences. No intermediary from
outside of the participating groups has been asked to conduct the negotiation process.
There are three conditions for the success of unassisted negotiations:
1. The issues in dispute, as well as the array of ... parties, should be
relatively few in number and readily identifiable.
2. The [parties] must be able to establish sufficient channels of communication to
permit joint problem solving.
3. The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of unilateral action must be moderately
high for all [parties].'
Most groups in a decision-making process will first attempt unassisted negotiation to
resolve any conflicts. The transition from decision making to unassisted negotiation is
a simple one, and most groups shift back and forth between the two modes during the
decision-making process. If, however, the parties in the group determine ahead of
time that they will not be able to meet the above criteria, or if their attempt at
unassisted negotiation has resulted in deadlock, the parties may try assisted
negotiation.
4Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. xvii.
5Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to
Resolving Public Disputes (n.p.: BasicBooks, 1987), p. 133.
Assisted Negotiation
An assisted negotiation is one in which the parties have retained the services of
an intermediary, who may either serve as a facilitator, a mediator, or a nonbinding
arbitrator. As a facilitator, the intermediary is the least involved with the substance of
the negotiation. Instead, the facilitator focuses on administering the process and
maintaining clear lines of communication among the parties.
The facilitator focuses almost entirely on process, makes sure meeting places
and times are agreed upon, sees that meeting space is arranged appropriately,
and ensures that notes and minutes of the meetings are kept. He or she
sometimes acts as a moderator, usually when many parties are involved.'
If the facilitator has strong negotiating skills, but is not able to produce agreement
acting just as a facilitator, the group may ask the facilitator to shift roles and act as a
mediator.
As a mediator, the intermediary is more involved with the substance of the
negotiation than a facilitator, while still maintaining the responsibility for
administering the process. A mediator is expected to meet confidentially with the
parties in order to learn about their interests and to suggest options that will move
them closer to agreement. Parties use the mediation approach when the process is
moving too slowly with just a facilitator, or they are unable to present options for
discussion on their own due to their rigid public positions.
If the parties are not willing to discuss different options, because they are
firmly committed to their positions, they may decide to have an intermediary act as a
6Ibid., p. 152.
non-binding arbitrator. Having a non-binding arbitrator allows the parties to learn
how an impartial "judge" would rule on the disputed issues, without having to be
bound to the arbitrator's decision. As a non-binding arbitrator, the intermediary is
focussed primarily upon the substance of the negotiation, since s/he is required to
present a decision to the parties.
In nonbinding arbitration, the disputing parties still control the design of the
process, but the intermediaries take more responsibility for devising possible
solutions. ... Obviously, then, the intermediaries in nonbinding arbitration
must be substantively knowledgeable--even more so than mediators. Ideally,
they understand not only the complexities of the issues in dispute, but also the
legal processes that may come to bear if all else fails.'
Occasionally, the intermediary's functions may shift among the three roles, but not
without the consent of all the parties.
Intermediaries must be "neutral." They must not have direct social, economic,
or political ties to any of the parties or the issues. "It is almost impossible to run a
fair, nonmanipulative meeting when you have a personal investment in the subject
matter."' Parties to an assisted negotiation retain control because of their power to
disqualify the intermediary if they feel s/he is biased or incompetent.
[T]here are several types of assisted negotiation which are not binding, and
which proceed only with the continuing assent of the negotiating parties. In
other words, all parties must be satisfied with the settlement reached through
such a consensual process, or there is no settlement. Because the stakeholders
retain veto power over the final outcome, they retain a vital measure of
control. 9
'Ibid., p. 178.
8Doyle and Straus, p. 33.
9Susskind and Cruikshank, p. 138.
The process in the Met State case has primarily operated as an unassisted
negotiation. The State Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) convened
the three community Reuse Task Forces, and there was tacit agreement that the DCPO
Project Manager would manage the meetings. The three Task Forces hired a planner
from the regional planning agency to help them develop and choose among reuse
options. The planner completed some of the tasks of a facilitator at several meetings.
She took minutes, arranged meetings, and prepared the agendas, but never conducted
the meetings. The planner was considered to be neutral because she did not favor any
particular agency or group. The planner was paid through the use of a state planning
grant, and she stopped attending Met State meetings when the funding ran out in 1993.
Since that time, the community Task Force members have not hired a replacement.
Swamp-Yankee Planning and the Ecologue Workshops
Swamp-Yankee planning and the Ecologue workshop process, planning
methods developed at MIT, provide useful guidelines for evaluating the Met State
reuse planning process. Swamp-Yankee planning, which is tailored for small
Northeastern towns, relies on seven basic principles to be observed by planners: lead
from the side, discover and rely on latent agreement, make "intentional" plans, plan to
plan in cycles, integrate planning and action, design participation, and respect
uncertainty.1 One of the most important intentions of Swamp-Yankee planning is to
allow community residents to own the planning process. In order to own the process,
'
0 Philip Herr, "The Art of Swamp-Yankee Planning" (Cambridge, MA: MIT Department of Urban
Studies and Planning, 12 September 1993), pp. 1-3.
the residents must generate their own ideas for action commonly through a
brainstorming process, rather than simply reacting to ideas proposed by community
leaders or outside agencies.
The Ecologue workshop process is a technique that can be used to implement
Swamp-Yankee planning.
The essence of ecologue is a set of workshops, with both small-group and all-
together sessions, the small groups having been assembled on a shared-interests
basis, such as where in the community they live, or their age-group (teen,
elder, neither), or their economic interest (businessperson, property owner,
developer). The work begins with as little topical predefinition as possible,
relying on the outcomes of brainstorming to provide definition of appropriate
topics for further exploration."
By creating groups of residents based upon their similar interests, the Ecologue
process facilitates discussion and encourages agreement within the groups. The
interest-based affinity groups created in the Ecologue process must be chosen carefully
to ensure that no one is excluded because they do not identify with any of the groups.
After the affinity groups are created, they begin a brainstorming session to
understand their task and to develop their own views and concerns. Brainstorming is
simply a technique designed to foster group identity and to allow all members of the
groups to have their views heard and legitimized. If instead each group was
represented by one person, the rich diversity of ideas available in the group could be
inadvertently screened out by the predispositions of the representative. Brainstorming
ensures that all the members' ideas are given equal standing during the creative stage.
"Ibid., p. 15.
After the brainstorming sessions, the affinity groups come together to share
their findings and to find areas of concurrence between the groups. As issues become
framed as topics for action, task forces are created around those issues. It is the job
then of the issue task forces to develop specific proposals for implementation.
Chapter Five will discuss the similarities and differences between the Swamp Yankee
planning process and the Met State reuse planning process.
To understand why the Met State disposition process is happening, the
following chapter describes the social, political, and economic factors that led to the
closure of seven Massachusetts Department of Mental Health hospitals.
Chapter Two
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill
The Rise and Fall of Large State Mental Hospitals
"In the eighteenth century, Americans began turning to institutions to care for
their mentally ill, first in workhouses and almshouses, next in asylums and hospitals,
and finally in large state-run mental hospitals."" These institutions were originally
designed to isolate the mentally ill and the mentally retarded from society and from the
pressures of daily living. Over the last several decades, theories of the methods of
care for socially segregated groups, including the mentally ill, have evolved from
isolation of the groups in large institutions to their integration into the community.
The state mental hospitals are now considered obsolete and inappropriate for a large
proportion of their mentally impaired clients. The rise and fall of these large state
mental hospitals illustrate the evolution of mental health ideology.
Large state mental hospitals were created in the mid-nineteenth century to take
advantage of economies of scale and to house the chronically mentally ill, a group of
patients considered unresponsive to treatment and, therefore, incurable. The number
of chronically mentally ill patients had been growing rapidly in the mid-1800s, due to
massive population growth from immigration. Previous methods of care for the
12 Ann Braden Johnson, Out of Bedlam: The Truth About Deinstitutionalization (n.p.: BasicBooks,
1990), p. 5.
mentally ill used in the asylums, which preceded state mental hospitals, did not prove
suitable for the huge caseload of chronic patients.
The care provided in the asylums was known as "moral treatment." "The
essence of moral treatment was its belief that mental patients could learn behavioral
self-control through a corrective relationship with a benign authority figure."" With
large numbers of chronically ill patients to care for, small group treatment sessions
with an authority figure became nearly impossible to manage and produced few
results. In order to more easily care for the chronically ill, the large state mental
hospitals were created. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as the mentally ill
population grew, the hospital costs escalated. Inevitably, the priority for the hospitals
became the custody rather than the treatment of their patients.
Although officially a medical institution in which treatment was presumed to be
the legitimate, announced purpose, in practice, the actual functions served by
state mental hospitals were (1) to provide inexpensive custody, control, and
segregation of persons who were disruptive of social order or burdensome to
their families; (2) to provide stable employment and health-welfare benefits for
their staff (and, historically, they did serve as the arena for the
professionalization of psychiatry); (3) to provide a cottage industry in towns
with few or no other economic resources; and (4) to operate as a backup or
"dumping ground" for cases deemed inappropriate or unacceptable by other
health and welfare organizations and community practitioners.14
The centralization of mental health care at the state level was caused in part by
the belief that local asylums did not provide adequate care for their patients, and that
state hospitals could be organized and monitored more efficiently.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
4Joseph P. Morrissey, Ph.D. et al., The Enduring Asylum: Cycles of Institutional Reform at
Worcester State Hospital (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1980), p. 291.
The first state to centralize control of its asylums was New York, which
created the position of State Commissioner of Lunacy in 1873. ... The
commissioner convinced the legislature to pass the State Care Act of 1890,
requiring that New York's counties send all of their mentally ill to state
hospitals for care in centralized facilities. The immediate result of this act was
a staggering increase in the population of the state hospitals: in the decade
following passage, the state hospital census in New York State went from
5,402 to 21,815, largely because the counties reclassified their senile elderly as
mentally ill and shifted much of the cost of their care to the state. The State
Care Act quickly became a model for the rest of the country. 15
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the mental hygiene movement
emerged as an outgrowth of the Progressive Era. The founders of the movement,
unhappy with the custodial care and severe overcrowding in the state mental
institutions, believed that
institutions (prisons or mental hospitals) could coexist with, and even sponsor,
non-institutional programs.... Institutions dominated the system so as to make
other options almost impossible to realize.... They imagined that non-
institutional programs might take away some clients from the institution, that
probation might spare an offender from a term in a state prison, that a
community clinic might spare a patient from a stay in a state hospital. 16
Unfortunately for the founders, the existing mental health system was not yet ready to
turn its patients out from the institutions into the community. State hospital
superintendents wanted to hold onto their powerful position as primary care givers
rather than become a supplement to the non-institutional programs. Although the
mental hygiene movement did not alter the methods of care in the early 1900s, it did
contribute to the changing ideology that led to the deinstitutionalization of the mentally
ill and the community mental health movement several decades later.
15 Johnson, p. 12.
16 David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive
America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 12.
Factors that Contributed to Deinstitutionalization
In the mid-1900s, several factors either amplified the mental health
community's dissatisfaction with state mental hospitals or created opportunities to
reduce the need for them: the deteriorating conditions of the state mental hospitals,
the invention of new treatment drugs, the shift in attitude toward the care of the
mentally ill, the emergence of new legal rights for the mentally ill, federal legislation
that directed attention away from state mental hospitals, and new federal programs that
allowed states to shift mental hospital patients to federal welfare rolls.
Conditions in State Mental Hospitals
The conditions within, and of, the state mental hospitals were deteriorating
rapidly. The care provided within the hospitals had worsened to the point that simple
custody was barely achieved.
In the 1940s, journalists began to expose inhumane conditions in overcrowded
and understaffed State mental hospitals (Deutsch, 1948; Gorman, 1948). At
that time, sedation and restraints were used more often than necessary, and
little active therapy was available to hospital residents. The custodial nature of
care made many hospitals seem more like prisons than therapeutic havens.
Reform-minded professionals and lay persons alike began to perceive these
institutions as inherently detrimental to patients, and they looked for ways to
improve hospital conditions and create better treatment alternatives (Foley and
Sharfstein, 1983; Goffman, 1961)."
A Life magazine article from 1946 contained graphic descriptions and pictures of the
appalling environment in which hospital patients were forced to live. This media
I"U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health,
Deinstitutionalization Policy and Homelessness (1989), pp. 3-4.
exposure of the conditions within the state hospitals encouraged the public to view the
hospitals as places of disrepute.
The conditions of the state hospitals also began to deteriorate as states turned
their attentions to other forms of mental health care. The majority of the hospitals
were built in the 19th century, but states were reluctant to invest money into needed
rehabilitation or capital construction for facilities that were becoming outmoded.
Dangerous living conditions resulted, causing the public to demand an alternative to
state mental hospitals. As the states responded to the calls for alternatives, the states
continued to divert funds away from the hospitals, continuing the cyclical decline of
the hospitals' physical conditions.
Advances in Drug Treatment
In the 1950s, several psychotropic drugs were created that helped control
symptoms of mental illness, particularly the symptoms of schizophrenia.
The use of drugs gave the staff [of state mental hospitals] greater confidence in
its own efficacy and helped dispel the feeling of hopelessness and apathy that
had captured the mental hospital. All these conditions gave impetus to
administrative changes such as eliminating restraints, minimizing security
arrangements, and encouraging early releases.' 8
Certain patients in the state mental hospitals who took the medications were then able
to be released into the community. The drugs could be administered anywhere, so the
former patients did not have to be readmitted to the hospitals. "For the first time in
18D. Mechanic, Mental Health and Social Policy, rev. ed., (1980), p. 87, as quoted in Paul Lerman,
Deinstitutionalization and the Welfare State (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982), p. 99.
..........
almost two hundred years the patient population of the mental hospitals was
decreasing." "
Shifts in Attitude toward Treatment
Social policy changed in the mental health community, as well as in other
segregated institutions (such as those for criminals and the physically disabled), from
reliance on institutional custodial care to case-by-case review of individuals and
reliance on community care programs. This shift in attitude was due in part to the
conditions of the state institutions and also to the realization that the mentally ill and
other populations are very diverse and that different persons can benefit from different
types of treatment. Not all of the residents of the state mental hospitals were
chronically ill, and, therefore, did not need to be kept in the hospital on a long term
basis. Integration into, rather than isolation from, the mainstream of society was
considered beneficial for the mentally ill who were thought to be stigmatized by their
residence in the state hospitals and their separation from the community.
New Legal Rights for Mentally Ill Persons
In the 1960s, several state and federal courts and state legislatures began to
establish certain rights for the mentally ill. The first right was the right to treatment,
which meant that custodial care was not sufficient. The second right was the right to
live in the "least restrictive environment."
The principle of least restrictive handling of governmental interests was first
set forth by the Supreme Court in a noninstitutional context, in Shelton v.
"9E. Fuller Torrey, M.D., Nowhere to Go: The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill (New
York: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 88.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 449 (1960). ... Following this precedent, legal experts in
the fields of mental health and retardation argued that the state has an
affirmative obligation to search for alternatives to commitment that are less
restrictive than a state hospital, whenever the state's purposes could be carried
out 'as well or better.' In addition, a state had a duty 'to limit confinement to
the least restrictive institutional setting and to discharge the committed patient
outright, or to less restrictive community alternatives, once continued
institutionalization could no longer be therapeutic.'20
The third right was the right to voluntary admission to state mental hospitals. "State
legislatures began to pass laws that required that persons be mentally ill and dangerous
to themselves or others before they can be involuntarily committed.",2  These latter
two rights virtually guaranteed a further decline in the state mental hospital census.
Federal Legislation
In the mid-1900s, federal legislation was the impetus for the move towards
deinstitutionalization of the state mental hospitals. The National Institute of Mental
Health was created in 1946, providing a national focus for mental health policy. "The
National Mental Health Act of 1946 provided training grants for mental health
manpower, created networks of community clinics, and stimulated research into
causes, diagnoses, and treatments of mental diseases." 22 In 1955, the Mental Health
Study Act was passed, which produced a study published in 1961, entitled Action for
Mental Health. This study provided a basis for the development of a national




'U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Deinstitutionalization, p. 5.
2 2Dan A. Lewis et al., Worlds of the Mentally Ill: How Deinstitutionalization Works in the City
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 15.
mandated community mental health centers that would provide inpatient, outpatient,
emergency, and partial hospitalization. By focusing attention on community mental
health centers, the federal government was encouraging states to transfer patients from
the state mental hospitals into the community, in other words, to deinstitutionalize the
mentally ill.
Funding Shift from State to Federal Government
The federal government inadvertently encouraged its deinstitutionalization
policy by creating federal welfare programs. States, of course, wanted to take
advantage of this opportunity to obtain federal funds. "Just as the county was eager to
shift a part of its social problems to state support (pre-1930), so were the states eager
to have external funds replace--or reduce--reliance on traditional, state-subsidized
institutionalization (post-1950)."" Patients in state mental institutions, however, were
not eligible for these federal welfare programs. In order to obtain federal funding,
states reclassified many mental hospital patients by placing them in community
settings. For example, if a state hospital patient was over 65 years old and was
transferred into a nursing home, the patient's costs could be paid by Medicare; if the
patient was transferred to a general hospital, the patient's costs could be paid by
Medicaid.
The creation of the Medicaid program in the mid-1960s created fiscal
incentives that further promoted a shift in the locus of care from State
institutions to community-based treatment programs, notably nursing homes and
general hospitals. In addition, the Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Program, and later the Supplemental Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
Lerman, p. 39.
Program, provided direct entitlements to mentally disabled individuals living in
the community. As a result of the confluence of these laws and policies, the
State hospitals' census was reduced nationally from 560,000 in 1955 to 216,000
in 1974; it fell to 100,000 in 1989 (NIMH 1991b).
One of the welfare programs mentioned above, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), which was created in 1972, replaced Aid to Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD). Unlike APTD, SSI provided 100 percent federal assistance, and removed
any funding requirements for the states. In anticipation of SSI, states quickly
transferred persons out from state mental institutions, where they could not be funded
under APTD, to general hospitals or other community settings, where they would be
APTD eligible.
Prior to SSI, from 1962 to 1970, the number of adult APTD recipients grew
from about 421,000 to 866,000--a gain of 106 percent in eight years. In only
four years from 1970 to the eve of SSI on December 31, 1973, the number of
adult APTD recipients soared to about 3 million persons--a gain of 247
percent. 5
These federal policies, in combination with the new drug treatments and social and
legal rights of the mentally ill, ensured that the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill
was in full effect all across the country.
Brief History of Massachusetts Mental Health Administration
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has a long history of providing services
to its mentally ill residents. In 1832, the Worcester Lunatic Asylum was established
as the first state program for the mentally ill.
2 4U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, Outcasts on
Main Street: Report of the Federal Task Force on Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness (1992), pp. 15-16.
2sLerman, p. 94.
The State Board of Insanity, which was created from the State Board of
Lunacy and Charities in 1898, was the first state agency specifically established
to oversee mental health programs. The Commission on Mental Diseases was
established in 1916, and, three years later, became a Department of Mental
Diseases. Subsequently, in 1938, the Department of Mental Health was
formed. ... By the early 1950's, there were twelve state hospitals serving
some 23,000 persons, representing an all time high in the state hospital
census. 26
Like the rest of the states, Massachusetts began establishing a community-based
system of care after the passage of the federal Community Mental Health Centers Act
of 1963. "Over a twenty year period (1960-1980), ninety percent of the clients in the
Massachusetts state hospitals were discharged to the community, where it was
anticipated that a full spectrum of treatment and support services would be
provided." 27 Federal legislation was not the only factor that encouraged provision of
acute care services of the mentally ill outside of Department of Mental Health (DMH)
hospitals.
The designation of mental health care as a reimbursable service under many
health insurance plans spurred the development of private mental health clinics,
which served large numbers of persons who required outpatient care. ... As
private mental health services became widely available for those with
insurance, DMH became the provider of last resort, for persons lacking these
resources.28
During the 1960s and 1970s, three of the twelve state mental hospitals were
closed, and the remaining nine were virtually ignored by the state administrators and
legislators. Resources were diverted away from the state hospitals to the community
2Connonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office for Administration & Finance, Division of Capital
Planning and Operations, Design Guidelines for Mental Health Facilities (2/89), v. 1, p. 15.
27Ibid., p. 6.
2"Ibid., p. 16.
mental health centers and other community programs. As conditions in the state
hospitals deteriorated, a new advocacy group formed in the early 1980s, the Alliance
for the Mentally Ill of Massachusetts, made up primarily of family members of
chronically mentally ill patients. At the same time, a report was issued by the
"Special Senate Committee to Review Commitment and Release Procedures of the
Department of Mental Health, which had investigated the conditions at the state
hospitals in the wake of a brutal murder committed by a prematurely-released state
mental patient."2 9 As a result of the report and the efforts of the Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, Governor Dukakis submitted to the legislature his Special Message on
Mental Health in 1985.
[T]he Governor's Special Message, entitled "A Comprehensive Plan to Improve
Services for Chronically Mentally Ill Persons," called for massive investments
in both capital and operating funds for the state's inpatient facilities, coupled
with equally substantial investments in community services. For the first time,
public policy supported both the institutions and the community-based system,
and articulated the role for each component in a complete system of care.3"
In 1988, the Department of Mental Health (DMH) published a Status Report to the
Governor's Special Message on Mental Health. DMH determined that the promise of
the Special Message had been "fulfilled" and that "DMH is becoming the provider of
choice, not the provider of last resort, for seriously mentally ill persons and their
families. "31
9Ibid., p. 9.
30 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Conmonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Human Services, Department of Mental
Health, From Promises to Programs: The Governor's Special Message on Mental Health: A Status Report
(8/88), p. 22.
In January 1991, Massachusetts' new Governor, William Weld, took office. In
the summer of 1991, Governor Weld's administration published Actions for Quality
Care, which called for the closure of four more of DMH's state hospitals: the
Gaebler Children's Center, the Metropolitan, Northampton, and Danvers state
hospitals. Another state hospital, Bridgewater Hospital for Sexually Dangerous
Persons, was transferred to the Department of Corrections. Patients from the closed
hospitals were sent to the remaining DMH hospitals, community residences, general
hospitals, nursing homes, or Mental Retardation Schools. The following excerpt from
Actions for Quality Care gives reasons why the state decided to consolidate the
hospitals.
The Commonwealth's inpatient facilities system, which was built to
accommodate over 35,000 individuals at its peak, today cares for 6,200 clients.
Encompassing some 10,500 acres and over 1,000 buildings, stretched over 34
campuses, the inpatient system is grossly oversized for the number of people in
its care. Moreover, of those 6,200 individuals receiving care in institutions, at
least 2,200 would be more appropriately cared for in community-based
settings. Today, the state's inpatient facilities, which do fill an important need
for very specific kinds of clients, would be appropriately-sized with capacity to
care for 4,000 clients (Special Commission, 1991).
Actionsfor Quality Care also called for enhancements to the community mental health
center system through maximization of Medicaid reimbursement opportunities,
development of additional residential beds, and development of a public managed care
system under the auspices of a local mental health authority.
Current Status of Massachusetts Mental Health Services
Out of the twelve Department of Mental Health hospitals once in operation,
four hospitals remain open under the auspices of DMH: Medfield (175 beds),
-W_ - 1 11 . ." - - ,; - 1 L 4 a X N
Taunton (330 beds), Westboro (240 beds), and Worcester (225 beds). There are also
two Department of Public Health hospitals with large DMH facilities: Shattuck and
Tewksbury. Since the two Department of Public Health hospitals are accredited by
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, and since
fewer than 50% of the patients are cared for by DMH staff, the hospitals are eligible
for Medicaid reimbursement.
The Department of Mental Health also owns and operates seven Community
Mental Health Centers (CMHC), which provide inpatient and outpatient care. Four of
the CMHCs operate outside of the Metropolitan Boston area, and provide strictly acute
care services. The other three CMHCs, which are within the Metropolitan Boston
area, provide a combination of acute and continuing care services. Since five of the
centers have 16 beds or fewer, they are not considered Institutes for Mental Disease
(IMD) and so are eligible for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. In total, DMH
operates 1,130 beds for the care of the mentally ill, with 160 at CMHCs and 970 at
the state hospitals.
In order to take advantage of cost savings and flexibility offered by private
vendors, DMH utilizes approximately ten private non-profit CMHCs for 20-25 % of
its clients." The private CMHCs are able to receive Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements and insurance payments.
Although there is no income eligibility standard to receive services, most often
persons with insurance or financial resources are served in private facilities.
3 2Connonwealth of Massachusetts, Governor's Special Commission on Consolidation of Health and
Human Services Institutional Facilities, Actions for Quality Care: A Plan for the Consolidation of State
Institutions & for the Provision of Appropriate Care Services (5/92), p. 13.
This is, in large part, a function of the intentional diversion by DMH of
persons with resources to other settings. ... This diversion is an essential
element of the Department's efforts to reduce overcrowding in its hospitals."
All seven of the DMH hospitals that have closed have been placed under the
control of the Massachusetts Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO).
Once the hospitals were declared surplus to the needs of the Department of Mental
Health, DCPO began the disposition process, which results in either the transfer of the
hospital properties to another governmental agency or the sale of the properties to a
private entity. To date, none of the hospital disposition processes have been
completed. The following chapter will discuss the legal and administrative
requirements for state property disposition, as they pertain to the state hospital
properties.




The closure of the seven Massachusetts Department of Mental Health hospitals
set in motion a lengthy planning process. Whenever a state facility is closed down,
the state agency that controls the facility must decide whether to keep the property or
declare it surplus to the agency's needs. If the agency decides that the property is
surplus, then the State Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) manages
the disposition of the property.
Chapter 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws, as amended by Chapter 579 of
the Acts of 1980 and Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1984, directs the Division of
Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) to manage the Commonwealth's real
property. One of DCPO's key property management responsibilities is the
surplus real property disposition process. This process can result in:
-transfer of the care, control, and use of property between state agencies;
-lease or conveyance to local or county or other public agencies;
-sale or lease to non-governmental user, following a competitive proposal
selection process."
In general, DCPO disposes of small surplus properties, consisting of one building or
parcel of land. When a property or facility is closed by a state agency, DCPO may
begin the reuse planning process in anticipation of the agency's declaration of surplus.
For large properties, like the state mental hospitals, the facility may be closed for
34 Connonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office for Administration and Finance, Division of
Capital Planning and Operations, Real Property Disposition Process, 11/86, p. 1.
many months before the declaration of surplus is signed by the state agency. The time
lapse allows the state agency to make a well thought out decision regarding the
agency's current and future needs for the property. Once the declaration of surplus is
signed, DCPO can begin its formal property disposition process.
The DCPO Real Property Disposition Process"
1. When a property is no longer needed by a state agency, the agency informs its
Secretariat, or DCPO if it is an Executive Agency, that the property is surplus to its
needs.
2. The Secretariat either:
Notifies DCPO that the property is no longer needed by the agencies in the
Secretariat, and documents the rationale for the decision in the agency capital
outlay budgets and 5-year plans.
OR
Recommends transfer of the property to another agency or vendor under its
purview. Once DCPO approval is obtained, transfer between agencies within
Secretariat is completed.
3. If the Secretariat determines that the property is surplus to the agencies in the
Secretariat, DCPO certifies the Secretariat's declaration of surplus and notifies all
Secretariats and Executive Agencies of the availability of the property. This state
agency polling process typically occurs for four weeks.
4. DCPO receives state agency use proposals and either:
Declares the property surplus to state need if none of the proposals is feasible
and consistent with the agency's capital outlay budget and 5-year plan.
OR
Transfers property to other state agency if substantive and feasible proposal is
received. Legislative authorization is required for significant changes in use.
Once DCPO approval is obtained, transfer of control and use between agencies
is completed.
3 5 bid., pp. 1-2.
5. If DCPO declares the property surplus to state need, DCPO then notifies local and
county governments of property availability and requests substantive proposals for
direct public use of the property. DCPO receives proposals and either:
Determines that the property is surplus to public need if no proposals are
received or the proposals lack substance and the possibility of resources to
accomplish that purpose.
OR
Selects a proposal and holds a public comment on reuse terms and conditions
that should be included in the land disposition agreement and deed or lease.
Legislative authorization is required for disposition to the governmental body.
Once Legislature authorizes the disposition, DCPO executes deed or lease to a
public agency.
6. If DCPO determines that the property is surplus to public need, and the property is
of considerable size or value, DCPO initiates the process of disposition to a non-
governmental entity by convening one or more public hearings or meetings of a local
advisory group to assist DCPO in setting development guidelines for the property.
Local officials, legislators and citizens participate in these advisory groups, and the
guidelines are incorporated into authorizing legislation and a Request for Proposals
(RFP). This local advisory process is the focus of the thesis.
7. Legislative authorization for the disposition of the property is sought. (Certain
agencies, including the Department of Public Works, have prior legislative
authorization to dispose of property, in which case legislation for the disposition of
individual parcels is not required.)
8. Provided legislative authorization is obtained, property is appraised as to the
highest and best use and uses with any proposed restrictions or encumbrances.
9. DCPO invites proposals for the property through advertisements in the Central
Register and local newspapers for 4 weeks. Public hearing notice is also published in
the Central Register and local papers.
10. Requests for Proposals are distributed. Proposals are received and reviewed by
DCPO and advisory group. Public hearing held to present proposals and solicit public
comment.
11. Proposal selected by DCPO. DCPO circulates notice of disposition to local
government and legislature at least 120 days before disposition is completed. Land
disposition agreement (LDA) or lease negotiated.
12. Land disposition agreement and deed or lease are executed. DCPO transfers
property to non-governmental user.
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The twelve steps described above do not necessarily occur sequentially. In the case of
large properties, DCPO may conduct portions of the state and local polling processes
concurrently. This is useful if it becomes clear that a state agency and a local agency
would like to control different portions of the property. Administering the polling
processes concurrently allows DCPO to consider the options for a reuse package for
the entire property.
Legislative Authorization
Depending upon the reuse options being considered for the surplus property,
legislative authorization is required in order for DCPO to complete the disposal of the
property. Legislative authorization is required in three cases: when the property is
transferred between state agencies and will undergo a significant change in use; when
the property is sold or leased to a local or county government; or when the property is
sold or leased to a non-governmental entity. A significant change in use for a
property is defined as "either a change in the purposes for which such building is
currently used or a change in use in excess of fifty per cent of the usable floor
space...." 36 Since all seven of the closed state mental hospitals will be undergoing a
significant change in use and/or will be transferred to a local governmental agency or
non-governmental entity, DCPO must seek legislative authorization for their disposal.
While legislative authorization is only mentioned briefly in the DCPO Real
Property Disposition Process and in Chapter 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws,
"Massachusetts, General Laws (1984), c. 7, sec. 40F.
obtaining legislative authorization is one of the most important steps in property
disposition. No amount of planning on the part of DCPO can guarantee that the state
legislators will approve the property disposition legislation. Of course, the state
legislators will be more likely to approve the legislation if their constituents support it.
For DCPO, obtaining the approval of the legislators and constituents of the
community, or communities, in which the property resides is crucial. Particularly for
large properties, where the impact of any chosen reuse will be widely noticed, DCPO
often asks for input from the community legislators and constituents. Gaining
community input helps DCPO produce a wise reuse plan and often expedites
legislative approval.
In deciding how to obtain community input, DCPO is guided by Chapter 7 of
the Massachusetts General Laws.
The deputy commissioner [of DCPO] may convene an advisory committee to
advise him on reuses and to recommend reuse restrictions for property declared
surplus. If an advisory committee is convened, the deputy commissioner shall
invite the representatives to the general court from the city or town in which
the property is located to serve on the committee. The deputy commissioner
shall prepare a preliminary report on his findings, which shall include both his
recommendation, and those of the advisory committee if established, for reuse
restrictions for the property.3 7
In addition to asking state legislators to serve on the advisory committee, DCPO often
asks local public officials and citizens to serve on the committee. DCPO is also
required by law to hold public hearings to invite community input and to explain any
actions to be taken with the property. Acquiring the input of the community officials
37Ibid.
and citizens in the preliminary planning stages is valuable for DCPO in obtaining the
support of the state legislators before disposition legislation is even filed.
When DCPO decides that the reuse options and reuse restrictions have been
sufficiently clarified and agreed upon, DCPO will draft the property disposition
legislation. Chapter 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides DCPO with
requirements for disposition legislation.
If the deputy commissioner [of DCPO] is recommending the approval of a bill
proposing the disposition of a parcel exceeding two acres, said report shall
include: (1) a description of the property including its current use, structures,
and approximate metes and bounds; (2) the value of the property, determined
through procedures customarily accepted by the appraising profession as valid
for such purposes, calculated both for (a) the highest and best use of the
property as currently encumbered and (b) uses and encumbrances that would be
imposed by the bill if enacted; (3) all current and foreseeable direct public uses
identified by following the division's procedures for such purposes as they
apply to the property to be disposed; (4) other potential public and private uses
of the property; and (5) any other information the general court may require.3 8
If an advisory committee has been created, DCPO may decide to present the draft
legislation to the committee in order to gain their approval and expedite legislative
approval. When the proposed bill is completed, DCPO submits it to the Governor of
Massachusetts. The Governor is then responsible for actually filing DCPO's
legislation with the state legislature.
If the legislation is not passed, then DCPO or a state legislator can submit
legislation again with any revisions that may improve the chances of passage. Once
legislation is passed, then any transfer of the property, or portion of the property, to a
state agency is complete. If the legislation approves transfer to a local or county
"Ibid.
government, then that agency has the opportunity to purchase or lease the property
from the state. If the legislation approves transfer to a non-governmental entity, then
DCPO begins marketing the property, or portion of the property, and drafting a
Request For Proposals (RFP). The Request For Proposals refers to the reuse
document prepared by DCPO during the planning process and outlines any reuse
restrictions that must be adhered to. DCPO then follows the above steps 10 through
12 of the Real Property Disposition Process.
In the case of the Metropolitan State Hospital disposition, DCPO is still
meeting with the three advisory groups, or Reuse Task Forces, but has begun to draft
disposition legislation. Chapter Four documents the steps in the disposition process





The Metropolitan State Hospital disposition process provides a rich case study
for learning about inter-local decision making and conflict resolution. When the
Hospital was closed down by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health in the
fall of 1991, the State began to plan for its reuse. The Massachusetts Division of
Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO), which handles property reuse planning and
disposition, decided to convene an advisory committee made up of community
members in order to gain community consensus regarding the reuse of the property.
The Metropolitan State Hospital reuse planning has been complicated because the
property straddles three communities, each with a different governmental structure and
set of needs and resources. The State of Massachusetts, which currently owns the
property, also has its own needs and resources. These differences have led to conflict
over how best to reuse the property. This case study will explore why conflicts have
arisen and document how the three communities and the State have dealt with their
conflicts.
Brief History of the Metropolitan State Hospital
The property known as the Metropolitan State Hospital is located nine miles
northwest of Boston, Massachusetts. The property consists of 346 acres, which
straddle the Towns of Belmont and Lexington, and the City of Waltham. (See Map
#1) In the 1920s, the State of Massachusetts took the property by eminent domain in
order to build a state mental health hospital that would be accessible to the Boston
metropolitan area and would ease the caseload at Boston State Hospital. The
Metropolitan State Hospital was built in 1930 and, by the 1950s, housed almost 2,000
patients. "
The next few decades saw Metropolitan State Hospital decline in census and
physical condition, due to the state's tacit policy of deinstitutionalization. In 1985,
Governor Dukakis tried to slow the deterioration of the state hospitals by proposing
multiple renovation projects in his Special Message on Mental Health. By 1990, most
of the renovation projects were only in the design stages and were put on hold when
Governor Weld was elected. In 1991, under Governor Weld, the Special Commission
on Consolidation of Health and Human Services Institutional Facilities published
Actions for Quality Care. This plan called for the closure of several state hospitals,
including Metropolitan State Hospital and the adjacent Gaebler Children's Center. At
the time of the report, Metropolitan State Hospital was undergoing a phase down from
400 patients to 120 patients, and its census was 260. One reason for the closure of
the Hospital was its deteriorated physical condition.
The Metropolitan campus was built in two groups of buildings. The buildings
are in fair condition but are inappropriately built for today's health care
standards. These layouts add to inefficient operating costs for staffing, energy,
security, communications and maintenance. The site utility structures and
3 9Chris Pilkington, "The Architecture of the Unwanted: Crisis in the Implementation of the
Community-Scale Institution" (Master's thesis, School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of





power plant are original and need significant repairs/rebuilding. Estimates to
rebuild the newer portion of the campus for 120 institutional beds and 80
transitional beds approaches $17 million dollars. These funds would be more
appropriately invested in community programs and other state facilities.40
Another reason for closure was the desire to save money by placing patients in
facilities that qualified for federal reimbursements. "The annual net state per patient
cost at Metropolitan State Hospital is $98,500. Providing the necessary services in an
appropriate setting will result in a savings of $12.93 million dollars annually, a 5 year
savings of $65 million dollars. "41 The plan then called for the 260 patients at
Metropolitan State Hospital to be transferred to other care settings. Fifty percent
would be moved to other state hospitals, 35% to community residences, 10% to
general hospitals, and the remainder to either nursing homes or Mental Retardation
Schools.42 The Metropolitan State Hospital was closed in the fall of 1991 and declared
surplus by the Department of Mental Health in the fall of 1992.
The Gaebler Children's Center, which is adjacent to the Metropolitan State
Hospital, was closed by the Department of Mental Health in the fall of 1992. Gaebler
was built in the early 1950s, and, at its peak, provided care for 155 children.4 3
Gaebler was closed down primarily because of the costs involved in obtaining national
4 Actions for Quality Care: A Plan for the Consolidation of State Institutions & for the Provision of
Appropriate Care Services: Report of the Governor's Special Connission on Consolidation of Health and
Human Services Institutional Facilities, David P. Forsberg, Chairman (Boston: Executive Office of Human
Services, 1991), p. 58.
4'Ibid.
4 Ibid.
43Letter to Eileen Elias, Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Commissioner from Joan Mikula,
Assistant Commissioner, Child/Adolescent Services. Boston, 2 April 1992.
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accreditation by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations. Governor Weld's Actions for Quality Care explains the reasons for
closure:
-- An infusion of $4 million is needed for renovations to become Medicaid
reimbursable.
-- The current site is not cost-effective if the configuration includes fewer
inpatient beds.
-- The cost of the superstructure required for a certified hospital (eg. professional
committees, medical records) increases the per diem rate.
-- Gaebler, being a state institution and isolated from the community, has a
stigmatizing effect upon children and families who go there to receive
services."
The Department of Mental Health transferred its funding for children's services to
private psychiatric hospitals, community mental health centers, and residential
programs. Once the Gaebler Children's Center was closed, the Massachusetts
Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO) added the Gaebler property to
the Metropolitan State Hospital property, in order to develop a cohesive reuse plan for
both sites.
The Initial Planning Process
Metropolitan State Hospital contains one of the last large undeveloped open
spaces located within the Route 128 belt. The property is adjacent to institutional
properties, conservation land, and residential neighborhoods. Nearby are the McLean
Hospital and Middlesex Hospital. The property straddles three communities, with
9.5% of the acreage in the Town of Belmont, 25.5% in the Town of Lexington, and
4 4 Actions for Quality Care: Appendix: Department of Mental Health Recommendations (Boston:
Executive Office of Health and Human Services, 1992), Appendix 7, p. 2.
65 % in the City of Waltham. Undeveloped open space constitutes 80% of the area, or
270 acres, with the remaining 75 acres consisting of several hospital buildings and
surrounding grounds. (See Map #2) When Metropolitan State Hospital closed, DCPO
and the three communities realized that they had a wonderful resource to reuse.
The portions of Met State within each community are very different. The
9.5 % located in the Town of Belmont is undevelopable because it comprises wetlands
and steep slopes. The 25.5% located in the Town of Lexington contains the main
hospital buildings and the majority of reusable floor area. The 65% located in the
City of Waltham contains the Gaebler Children's Center building, seven small campus
buildings, a large front lawn, Mackerel Hill (with scenic vistas), and wetlands. The
Belmont portion is zoned "Single Family Residential D", the Lexington portion is
zoned "One-Family Dwelling", and the Waltham portion is zoned "Conservation/
Recreation." The three communities are likely to change their zoning depending on
the reuse options chosen.
Since Belmont and Lexington are Towns and Waltham is a City, their forms of
government are also very different. The Town of Belmont has a three-member Board
of Selectmen and a Town Administrator. The Selectmen have most of the
administrative power of the Town. The Town Administrator has some administrative
power but less than a Town or City Manager. The Town of Lexington has a five-
member Board of Selectmen and a Town Manager. Both Belmont's Town
Administrator and Lexington's Town Manager are responsible for the daily operations
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representatives. The Town Meeting members have the legislative power to pass
bylaws. In contrast, the City of Waltham has a 15-member City Council and a
Mayor. The Mayor has significant administrative power, combining the roles of the
Board of Selectmen and Town Manager. These governmental forms represent distinct
modes of democracy and distinct levels of perceived accountability to their citizens.
One of DCPO's initial steps in the reuse planning process was to ask the
Boards of Selectmen from the Towns of Belmont and Lexington and the Mayor of the
City of Waltham to each appoint a Reuse Task Force for the Metropolitan State
Hospital (hereafter referred to as Met State). The purpose of creating the Task Forces
was to develop a forum for discussion of reuse options for Met State. Since the
property will not continue to be used as a mental health hospital, DCPO must obtain
legislative approval of the Met State disposition. DCPO feels that the only way to
obtain legislative approval is to obtain community approval. Creating the Task Forces
allows representatives from the three communities and DCPO to work together to
define a mutually acceptable reuse for Met State.
The three Task Forces are both similar and different in many ways. Each has
five to ten voting members and one chairperson. Each Task Force also has
representatives from its community's Conservation Commission and Planning Board or
Planning Department as members. The personalities and styles of the Task Force
members, however, are quite distinct. Each Task Force member has a different
personal background affecting the reasons he or she is interested in the future of Met
State and affecting the values that he or she brings to the Met State meetings. For
example, Anita Hume, a member of the Belmont Task Force and former Task Force
chairwoman, is a member of the Belmont Cemetery Planning and Development
Committee. At the beginning of the Met State planning process, Hume supported
putting a cemetery on a portion of the Met State site. Marie Daly, a Waltham Task
Force member, co-founded the Beaver Brook Watershed Coalition, which advocates
for the environmental protection and preservation of the Watershed. Since Met State
comprises part of the Watershed, Daly opposed the cemetery proposal.
The Task Forces contacted the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), a
regional planning agency, in the spring of 1992 to ask for data and technical assistance
in determining the best land use options for Met State. DCPO already had access to
technical planning data through its consultants, and the Task Force members wanted a
consultant of their own, who would work with all three Task Forces. Joan Blaustein,
a Land Resources Planner from MAPC, became responsible for attending meetings
with the Task Forces. Joan helped gather market data for several reuse options,
arrange Task Force meetings, and prepare minutes from the meetings. Because of the
large amount of staff time deemed necessary for the Met State process, Joan applied
for the State-funded Municipal Incentive Grant to help the Task Forces pay for her
services. In the grant application, Joan stated that she would use the funding to study
municipal re-use options for the property.
A Project Manager from DCPO's Office of Real Estate Management, Lorrie
Louder, began meeting with the three Task Forces in the summer of 1992. The
Project Manager and the Task Force members soon realized that their goals for reuse
of the property were quite different. DCPO wanted to maximize revenues from the
sale of the site. Governor Weld had just promised to save money by closing the state
hospitals down and promised to raise over $100 million in revenue from the sale of
these prime real estate properties. Given the Administration's policy goal, DCPO
asked its consultant, Penobscott Group, to determine the reuse of the Met State
property that would generate the most revenues. The consultant's report
recommended over one million square feet of office space. When DCPO presented
that recommendation to the three communities, their response was extremely negative.
The three Task Forces do not believe that maximizing revenues should be the
primary goal in reusing the property. The Task Forces want to tailor a reuse that will
serve the needs of the three communities. In fact, the Task Forces felt that DCPO
was trying to complete the reuse planning process as quickly as possible in order to
minimize community input and guarantee that the property would be reused by the
highest paying developer. In November 1992, the DCPO Project Manager, Lorrie
Louder, presented the Task Forces with a marketing brochure that DCPO had
developed for Met State to solicit interest from developers. The Task Forces thought
that DCPO was acting prematurely, since the state and local polling processes required
for property disposition had not been completed yet. Louder stated that DCPO wants
to see an economic return on the site, but with a use that is consistent with the
communities' desires. Louder was not well received by the Task Force members, not
simply because she represented DCPO's interests, but also because of her personal
style. In the view of a number of those interviewed, Louder did not consider the Task
Force members' interests to have equal standing with DCPO's interests, and,
therefore, she treated the Task Force members condescendingly.
Also in November 1992, a Met State Working Group was created at the
suggestion of DCPO. The purpose of the Working Group was to form a group of
workable size to help shape the Met State reuse options. The Working Group met
frequently in between the larger tri-community Met State meetings. Since attendance
at the tri-community meetings had been averaging 30 people, the DCPO Project
Manager felt that the smaller Working Group would make the meetings more
productive. The Working Group was made up of the DCPO Project Manager, Joan
Blaustein of MAPC, Dan Driscoll of the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC),
the Task Force chairmen from Lexington and Waltham, the Town Administrator of
Belmont, and one staff person from each community. The municipal Working Group
members were expected to represent the views of their communities' Task Forces.
Lorrie Louder, the first DCPO Project Manager, left DCPO when the Working
Group was created. Carol Gladstone, the Director of DCPO's Office of Real Estate
Management replaced Louder for one meeting, and was succeeded by John Civilinski,
the new Director of the Office of Real Estate Management. John Civilinski asked
David Dixon, a consultant from Goody Clancy & Associates, to assist DCPO in
improving its relationship with the three communities and in responding to the
technical planning issues as they emerged. In March 1993, John Civilinski appointed
Mika Brewer to be the Project Manager. Mika Brewer and David Dixon have since
represented DCPO at Met State meetings. By tacit agreement among the Task Force
members and DCPO, Brewer and Dixon have led most of the Working Group and tri-
Task Force meetings and have been responsible for drafting the Met State Reuse Plan.
Both inside and outside of DCPO's reuse planning process, citizens from the
Met State communities have been very active in trying to influence the reuse options
being considered. One of the first concerns raised was the possible impacts of the
reuse options on the sensitive environmental habitats and wetlands located at Met State
that are part of the Beaver Brook Watershed. In the spring of 1992, Marie Daly, a
Met State abutter who later became a Waltham Task Force member, formed the
Beaver Brook Watershed Coalition with John Andrews of Citizens for Lexington
Conservation and Nancy Childs, a naturalist at Habitat Institute in Belmont who later
became a Belmont Task Force member. The Coalition mapped the wetlands and other
sensitive areas at Met State. The Coalition also conducted tours of the Met State
property and gave slide shows to community groups to educate citizens and public
officials about the importance of preserving the undeveloped land. Most importantly,
the Coalition succeeded in gaining the interest of the Metropolitan District Commission
(MDC), which owns and operates over 16,000 acres of parks and reservations in the
metropolitan Boston area. The Coalition proposed that MDC try to acquire a portion
of Met State for a reservation during the state polling step of the DCPO disposition
process. MDC eventually agreed to the Coalition's proposal, and Dan Driscoll, an
MDC Senior Planner, began attending Met State meetings.
The second issue was the historic value of the buildings and courtyards at Met
State. In the fall of 1992, Candace Jenkins, a historic preservation consultant and
Belmont Task Force member, informed the other Task Force members that
rehabilitating and preserving the main campus buildings could be less costly than
tearing down the buildings, as DCPO wanted to do. DCPO felt that razing the
buildings would make Met State more attractive to developers. Candace also served
as a consultant to the Massachusetts Historical Commission, which nominated 15 state
hospital campuses, including Met State, to the National Historic Register. The Met
State nomination was accepted in January 1994. Being listed on the National and State
Registers means that the historical and architectural significance of Met State must be
considered for any project in which federal or state money is involved. The State will
be investing several million dollars at Met State to prepare the site for reuse.
The third issue was the traffic impacts that would be generated by high density
reuses at Met State. The main entrance to Met State is from Trapelo Road in
Waltham, which currently experiences heavy traffic during morning and afternoon
rush hours. Consistent with traffic impact information gathered by DCPO's consultant
and the traffic engineers from the three communities, the Task Forces determined that
the high density office complex originally suggested by DCPO would be totally
unacceptable.
As a way of summarizing the concerns that emerged out of the preliminary
Met State discussions, the three Task Forces agreed on four common goals:
Goal 1: Preserve and protect the natural resources of the site as an ecological
preserve open to the public
Goal 2: Redevelop the site with a mix of publicly beneficial uses and revenue
producing uses which meet the following performance criteria:
-Generate relatively low traffic levels
-Preserve the feeling of openness and visual quality of the site from
adjacent roads
-Minimize adverse impacts on surrounding neighborhoods
-Reflect locally identified needs and priorities
-Not adversely affect the protected open spaces
-If feasible, rehabilitate the existing buildings and protect historic landscapes
Goal 3: Consider the site as a whole, without regard to municipal boundaries
Goal 4: Restore use of the site as early as possible giving due regard to all
environmental protection laws and fiscal constraints"
Goal 4 was set because Met State is on the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection 21E Site List as a Confirmed Disposal Site. "[T]here is
evidence of subsurface contamination from leaking fuel tanks, pollution of a tributary
to Beaver Brook, improper storage of oily wastes and asbestos health hazards, all
within the power plant. "46
DCPO also developed its own goals for the planning process:
Goal 1: Achieve consensus plan for redevelopment of property
Goal 2: Enact legislation authorizing disposition consistent with consensus plan
Goal 3: Revise local zoning to allow uses and density identified in the consensus
plan
DCPO realizes that by achieving Goal 1, achieving Goal 2 is made easier. DCPO
also has six goals for redevelopment:
Goal 1: Redevelopment plan which is financially feasible (self funding), and which,
at minimum, generates sufficient revenue for the state to cover costs of site
4 5Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Re-Use Recommendations for Metropolitan State Hospital:
DRAFT (June, 1993), p. 6.
46Letter to Christopher Pilkington, Director of Office of Programming, Massachusetts Division of
Capital Planning and Operations, from Daniel Viscardi, Project Director, Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. Boston,
30 October 1992.
preparation necessary to allow redevelopment to occur (eg, environmental
remediation, demolition and/or building stabilization, road and utility work)
Goal 2: Preservation of important natural resources
Goal 3: Support uses which encourage long term economic health of region (jobs
and economic activity, housing)
Goal 4: Increase local tax base, local tax revenue
Goal 5: Provide benefits to the clients of the Department of Mental Health
Goal 6: Redevelopment plan which can happen in a timely fashion, to minimize
holding costs47
These six goals show a significant change in DCPO's willingness to meet the needs of
the three communities. This change in attitude stems from the realization that
DCPO's primary goal is to pass disposition legislation, not to maximize state
revenues. In order to pass legislation, DCPO must obtain community support.
The Working Group
In November 1992, MAPC was awarded the State Municipal Incentive Grant.
Joan Blaustein's first task was to develop a list of desired potential uses for Met State.
Joan suggested that each municipality nominate a few uses, and that the Working
Group select three uses from the nominations to be studied under the grant. The
Belmont Task Force nominated preservation of open space, housing that would meet
regional needs, and a cemetery, which was anticipated to be inappropriate for the site.
The Lexington Task Force nominated preservation of wetlands and open space, mixed
ownership and rental housing for mixed income households, and private/public
47Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Re-Use Recommendations: DRAFT (June, 1993), p. 7.
educational or agricultural uses. The Waltham Task Force nominated housing for
first-time homebuyers, Bentley College expansion, senior housing/assisted care,
recreational use, and a golf course.4 8
The Working Group met for one year, trying to narrow the number of reuse
options being considered. The Group's progress was impeded since most of the
community Working Group members did not, or were not able to, represent all the
interests of their Task Force members. The Working Group members also had
different styles for communicating issues between the Working Group and the Task
Forces. Some Working Group members thought that their role should be just to
convey information back and forth. Others thought that they should speak for their
Task Force members. During this time, the three Task Forces met together
infrequently at public meetings, at which the Working Group members would speak as
a panel to the other Task Force members. The public meetings were an attempt to
present the Working Group's progress to the Task Force members and the public and
to obtain their feedback.
Both Working Group and Task Force members expressed their frustration
regarding this stage of the planning process. Several Working Group members were
frustrated that the Working Group was not able to make substantive decisions, since
the community Working Group members could not represent the interests of the Task
Forces. Within each Task Force there were differing viewpoints about the reuse
4 Joan Blaustein, Minutes of the Metropolitan State Hospital Meeting, Belmont, MA, 8 December
1992.
issues, making it difficult for the community Working Group members to commit to
specific proposals. Several Task Force members were frustrated because of the
perception that decisions were being made at Working Group meetings without their
input. This perception was reinforced by newspaper articles touting that deals were
being made between the Task Force chairmen and DCPO.
The Fact Finding Groups
In an effort to end the frustration and misunderstandings, DCPO suggested that
the three Task Forces meet together more often to try to get consensus on the reuse
issues in the political arena of the tri-community public meetings. More importantly,
one of the Working Group members suggested that joint committees be created around
the issues that were causing conflict. The Working Group members formed three Fact
Finding groups, made up of Task Force members and staff from each community.
The goal of the Fact Finding groups was to develop objective information that all the
diverse interests could agree upon as a basis for decision making. It was difficult,
however, for the Working Group and Task Force members to clearly articulate the
duties of the Fact Finding groups. For example, the traffic Fact Finding group was
initially going to determine the traffic impacts from a range of reuse options. Instead
the group tried to determined whether the uses already described in the draft reuse
plan would have workable traffic impacts, and concluded that the impacts would, or
could, be mitigated. A few Working Group members, however, wanted the traffic
group to complete its initial objective of determining the traffic impacts of a range of
options. Belmont's planning consultant, for example, wanted to be able to provide
data to the Belmont Task Force members to justify the preclusion of particular reuses.
Nevertheless, the traffic group never obtained data for the reuse impacts.
The second group was to address the alternatives for protecting the front lawn
of Met State along Trapelo Road and for providing recreation uses, such as a golf
course. Instead, the group spent the majority of its time creating conditions for the
proposed golf course to make it as environmentally benign as possible. The golf
course idea was first proposed as an 18-hole course by the Waltham Task Force
chairman in December 1992. After preliminary mapping of the site determined the
extent of the wetland area, the 18-hole golf course was removed from the list of reuse
options since it would not fit in the developable area. In the summer of 1993, the golf
course idea resurfaced. This time, the Waltham Task Force chairman proposed a
nine-hole public golf course, since the Task Force had received calls from Waltham
citizens asking for a golf course and since the Mayor of Waltham strongly desired a
golf course. DCPO hired a golf course designer who said that a nine-hole course
could fit on the site. Given that fact, the Waltham Task Force chairman applied
pressure on the other Working Group members to study the golf course further. Most
likely, this pressure changed the focus of the golf course Fact Finding group.
The third group addressed the community housing needs that should be met in
the Met State developable area. While all three communities have different housing
needs, the housing Fact Finding group has been able to meet its objectives more easily
than the other two groups. This is due in part to the fact that nearly all of the housing
units will be in Lexington, and that housing as a reuse option is supported by all three
communities. In contrast, traffic generation can have negative effects on all three
communities and prevents reuse options favorable to some communities from being
considered. Likewise, the golf course proposal has long divided the Task Force
members, creating differing perceptions as to the objectives of the Fact Finding group.
The housing Fact Finding group also addressed the needs of the mentally ill.
The Alliance for the Mentally Ill (AMI), a non-profit advocacy group, and the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health both expressed a desire to designate a
portion of the housing units for the mentally ill. AMI wants either 10% of all the
units to be supported apartments randomly situated throughout the development and
10% of the proceeds from sale to be placed into a housing trust fund for DMH, or a
larger housing trust fund, if fewer units can be supported. AMI also wants the
cemetery on the site preserved as it contains the remains of former Hospital patients.4 9
The Fact Finding group decided to conduct further study on the specific housing
types that could be provided at Met State and the feasibility of developing special
needs housing.
The Subcommittees
As the Fact Finding groups continued gathering data, their roles gradually
shifted. The original golf course and housing Fact Finding groups were reconfigured
as policy making Subcommittees. The traffic Fact Finding group was disbanded, since
several Task Force members felt that the traffic data had reached a sufficient level of
4 9Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Massachusetts, "Reuse of Metropolitan State Hospital Property
Located in Belmont, Lexington and Waltham," 9 March 1994.
detail. A third Subcommittee was created to meet with Dan Driscoll, the Senior
Planner from the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), to refine the proposal for
a Met State reservation. Like the Fact Finding groups, the Subcommittees are
composed of Task Force members from all three communities.
The reservation Subcommittee has been learning how MDC will operate the
MDC reservation, and has provided feedback to Dan explaining the interests of the
Task Force members. The salient issue throughout the discussion of the MDC
reservation has been the ability of MDC to provide sufficient maintenance for the
reservation, given MDC's recent budget cutbacks. As a way to protect against the
funding uncertainty, the Waltham Task Force chairman proposed that a portion of the
operating revenue from the golf course be used to maintain the reservation. The
reservation Subcommittee has been discussing the possibility of creating a permanent
reservation group to coordinate the transfer of money from the golf course to the
reservation. Several Waltham Task Force members and MDC, however, see a
permanent reservation group as a possible threat to their control over their portions of
the property.
Creating opportunities for synergy among the reuse options has been difficult
throughout the process. The adversarial nature of many of the Met State meetings has
precluded free exchange among Task Force members. Complex issues have been
simplified by DCPO and the Task Force members to try to prevent attacks on the
details of a proposal and to try to gain consensus more quickly. This simplification
has frustrated Task Force members who would like to discuss the details in order to
ensure that the reuse document is clearly interpreted by those who will use it. Efforts
at simplification have not helped the process proceed more quickly. In fact, previous
areas of consensus have been renegotiated to allow the Task Force members to
adequately voice their concerns and to deepen the level of detail discussed. Despite
these problems, the Task Force members and DCPO appear to have reached closure
on their list of desired reuse options.
Next Steps
DCPO is currently drafting disposition legislation for Met State which will:
create an MDC reservation; allow the City of Waltham the opportunity to create a
public golf course; allow DCPO to draft two Requests for Proposals, one for housing
developers for the buildable area in Lexington and one for institutional users or
developers for the Gaebler Children's Center; and create a trust fund for the
Department of Mental Health for a portion of the State revenues from the sale of the
site. DCPO will present the legislation to the three Task Forces sometime in May
1994. Once Task Force approval is obtained, DCPO will submit the legislation to the
Governor's office for filing. Two-thirds of the legislature must approve the bill before
it is passed. The State Representatives for the three communities have said that if
their constituents support the legislation, they will vote for the legislation. DCPO and
the Task Forces believe that it is likely that the bill will pass if it has the support of
the Belmont, Lexington, and Waltham Representatives.
Chapter Five
Lessons from the Metropolitan State Hospital
Reuse Planning Process
Analysis of the Met State Reuse Planning Process
The Massachusetts Division of Capital Planning and Operations (DCPO)
initiated community involvement in the Met State reuse planning process by asking the
governing bodies from the three communities to each appoint a Met State Reuse Task
Force. The current DCPO Project Manager for Met State, Mika Brewer, admits that,
at that time, DCPO had little experience setting up community forums for gathering
information and gaining consensus on property reuse. When Governor Weld closed
down several state hospitals in 1991, DCPO was expected to plan the large-scale
dispositions and negotiate with the communities to determine the properties' best
reuses. DCPO had to craft a new disposition procedure for the state hospitals because
of their large size and the significance of any change in their use. In fact, no state
hospital disposition procedure is the same. The procedures vary depending on the
property characteristics. For example, DCPO set up only one Reuse Task Force for
the Danvers State Hospital planning process, even though the Hospital straddles two
communities. Unlike Met State, all the Danvers State Hospital buildings and 90% of
the developable land are in one community. Therefore, setting up only one Reuse
Task Force seemed sensible to DCPO.
Each Met State Reuse Task Force has been expected both to represent its own
community's interests and to think regionally about the impacts of proposed reuse
options. This dual role has caused conflict both within and among the Task Forces.
The three Task Forces were able to set common goals and present a united front to
DCPO at the beginning of the planning process, when faced with DCPO's threat of
high density office development. When DCPO eased up on its demands for revenue
from the site, the Task Forces were forced to examine their individual interests, and
they discovered gaps in their views. The Task Force members then had to face the
most challenging aspect of group decision making: working proactively to create
acceptable reuse options, rather than simply reacting to DCPO proposals.
The Met State Task Forces, which are each made up of residents from the
same community, and the Beaver Brook Watershed Coalition, which was formed by
residents with common environmental interests, resemble the affinity groups that are
formed in the Ecologue workshops, described in Chapter One. Unfortunately, the Met
State Task Forces did not have a chance to brainstorm their views and interests, as
required by the Ecologue process. Instead, the Working Group was created shortly
after the planning process began, and the Group took on the responsibility of
determining three reuse options without having the Task Force members first establish
their broader issues of concern. The rush to develop reuse options was driven in part
by the state Municipal Incentive Grant awarded to MAPC. Rather than asking the
Working Group to brainstorm issues of concern on behalf of the Task Forces, Joan
Blaustein of MAPC asked the Working Group to nominate reuse options. The
Working Group's assignment was too narrow and preempted an initial creative
process. The Task Force members were not able to explore and legitimize their
visions for Met State.
Another challenge faced by the Working Group members was accurately
communicating the concerns of their respective Task Force members to the Working
Group and convincing the other Working Group members of their ability to do so.
Given the complexity and diversity of interests within each community, the expectation
that the individual Working Group members could and would represent them was
inappropriate. In addition, the format for the public tri-community meetings did not
facilitate an equal sharing of information among the Working Group members, the
other Task Force members, and the public. The public meetings should have been an
opportunity for community members to play a greater role in shaping the issues.
Instead, the meetings were used by the Working Group members to present their
views and allow the residents to react to the proposals.
A critical turning point in the process came when the Task Force members
decided to create the three Fact Finding groups, and later the three policy making
Subcommittees. All six groups were formed around particular issues, made up of
members from all three Task Forces. The groups resemble the topical task forces
created in the second phase of the Ecologue process. The groups have helped to
demystify the issues and put them in tangible terms so that the reuse options may be
judged on their merits. Since the subcommittee membership cuts across community
lines, all three Task Forces have shared in the authorship of the subcommittee reports.
This shared responsibility has helped the Task Forces to work cooperatively together
and create value from Met State rather than claim it.
Although the Met State process has operated as an unassisted negotiation, the
process has not met the criteria described in Chapter One for an unassisted negotiation
or for group decision making. Namely, the number of issues and parties have not
been small in number, the channels of communication have not been sufficient for
creative exchange of ideas, and no one has been responsible for protecting individuals
from personal attack. Also, meeting minutes have not been taken, and the primary
written record of the process, the Met State Reuse Plan, has been drafted by the
DCPO Project Manager, rather than by a neutral party. These problems have led to
frustration, duplication of previous efforts, and misunderstandings, which point to the
need for a neutral person to manage the process.
The only neutral person in the Met State process was Joan Blaustein of MAPC.
The Task Force members and the DCPO Project Manager have all said that
Blaustein's role helped the process run more smoothly. Blaustein played a helpful role
by organizing meetings and agendas and providing input from a regional perspective.
Unfortunately, the work Blaustein was completing to satisfy the State Municipal
Incentive Grant requirements became almost irrelevant to the Task Force members as
their needs changed. Since the DCPO Project Manager was drafting the Met State
Reuse Plan, and DCPO's consultants were providing reuse option data, Blaustein's
grant products were no longer needed.
Since Blaustein was the only neutral party in the Met State process, it would
have been beneficial to the Task Force members if she had managed the Met State
process. As process manager, Blaustein could have made sure that all interest groups
were represented at meetings. The interests of the mental health community and
Massachusetts tax payers, for example, were never directly represented at Met State
meetings. The Department of Mental Health and the Alliance for the Mentally Ill
have only been represented through their published statements and through DCPO.
The interests of Massachusetts tax payers have been indirectly represented by DCPO
and State Representatives and Senators. Blaustein, however, did not take on the
process manager role. She stopped attending meetings and taking minutes when the
Municipal Incentive Grant funding ran out. No person has been solely responsible for
planning meetings and preparing agendas, and no one has taken meeting minutes since
Blaustein left the process.
Recommendations for Similar Processes
When setting up a decision making process for interlocal issues, an initial
analysis must be conducted to determine the communities and interest groups that
should be involved. Based on that analysis, groups should be formed to brainstorm
the different facets of the task at hand. No matter what type of group is formed to
make decisions, the purpose of that group must be clearly defined and redefined as
necessary. Taking these steps will help to ensure that no interests are ignored. When
interests are ignored, or not fully legitimized, at the initial stages of the process, those
interests will resurface and slow the progress of the group.
A decision making group should contain representatives from all the possible
interest groups. In the case of regional decision making, at least one person from
each community must be involved. When the communities and interest groups
involved are very different from each other, it is unwise to form only one group.
With one group made up of members with opposing interests, the members will not
feel comfortable freely exchanging ideas. In addition, only a few representatives of
each of the community interest groups can be members of the decision making group
in order to keep its size manageable. One group is also undesirable if the interest
groups fear that their representatives will be coopted by "groupthink" or will not have
an equal voice. The members of the communities and interest groups will want the
security of having their own group in which they can strategize. The interest groups
should be able to meet separately until the issues are framed and some common goals
are established. Once mutual interests are discovered, then committees should be
created by issue, rather than by community or special interest affiliation.
As the communities decide upon a group structure, they should agree to have
someone from outside the group manage the process. The planning models described
in Chapter One support this notion. The process manager should ensure that all the
interest groups are represented throughout the process. The process manager should
understand the political and legal context in which the process is operating, so that
s/he can remind the group of the outcomes of their decisions. Given the objective
stance of the process manager, s/he should be able to see the relationships between
different issues and keep track of the effects of decisions in one area on another area.
The process manager should be cognizant of the fact that an interlocal planning
process does not operate in a vacuum. Neighboring communities share a long history
and have established relationships. While a particular planning process is occurring,
the same communities may be working together on several totally separate issues.
Those issues, however, are interrelated since they all affect the communities'
relationships. If the process manager can bring this knowledge to bear, the process
will be fairer and more efficient than one without a process manager.
There are several sources available to communities for obtaining a process
manager. Consultants, local universities, and other community organizations are all
sources of professional managers. Regional planning agencies can be a particularly
good source of managers because their regional status usually ensures the manager's
neutrality regarding the local planning issues.
The process manager will have different levels of involvement in the content of
the process, depending upon the needs of the group. If the group decides that they
need in-depth assistance in crafting proposals and resolving conflicts, the group could
hire a facilitator or mediator to serve as their process manager. As explained in
Chapter One, facilitators have less involvement in the substance of the issues than do
mediators. Facilitators simply administer the process and maintain open lines of
communication among the group members. Mediators are expected to meet privately
with the group members and invent proposals. Massachusetts has a mediation service
which is a good source of facilitator and mediator referrals.
The Massachusetts Mediation Service (directed by David O'Connor) is under
the jurisdiction of the Executive Office for Administration and Finance. A 12-
member Board provides advice to a two-member staff. The MMS has already
mediated statewide disputes concerning hazardous waste disposal, the clean-up
of a Superfund site, and long-term health care insurance regulation.50
No matter what route is taken in crafting a planning process, it is very
important for the group to have a written record of each meeting and to document the
results of their efforts. While the goal of planning is to develop agreement on
intentions for action, not just to complete a report, a written record serves as a
common basis for interpreting the intent of the planning group. The process manager
should be responsible for producing the written records to prevent any perception of
bias. Providing a clear explanation of intent is crucial when control of the process is
handed over to the public officials responsible for implementing the final proposals.
soLawrence E. Susskind, "NIDR's State Office of Mediation Experiment," Negotiation Journal,
October 1986, p. 324.
Appendix
Belmont Met State Reuse Task Force Members
Voting
Douglas Reynolds, Chair
Ralph Child, Vice Chair
Richard Betts (Planning Board)
Nancy Childs (Beaver Brook Watershed Coalition)
John Dalton
Arthur Heron (Fair Housing Committee)
William Holmes (Housing Authority)
Anita Hume (Acting Chair, Cemetery Planning and Development Committee)
Candace Jenkins (Consultant to the Massachusetts Historical Commission)
John Murphy (Conservation Commission)
Non-Voting
Thomas Gatzunis, Town Engineer
Philip Herr, Planning Consultant
Melvin Kleckner, Town Administrator
Lexington Met State Reuse Task Force Members
Voting
Leo McSweeney, Chair (Member of Lexington Board of Selectmen)




Dick Canale (Planning Board)
Jackie Davidson (Planning Board)
Shirley Frawley
Waltham Met State Reuse Task Force Members
John Snedeker, Chair (Director of Public Works, former Commissioner of
Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission)
John Bradley (Chair of Conservation Commission)
Gloria Champion (Conservation Commission)
Marie Daly (President of Beaver Brook Watershed Coalition)
Michael Squillante (City Councillor)
Edward Tarallo (City Councillor)
Ronald Vokey (Planning Director)
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